The European Response to the Syrian War: Pathologies Uncovered
Available in National Library (Singapore). Author: Dostal, Jörg Michael,, Length: 73 p.: Identifier: Apr 8, Syria is the last member of the Euro-Mediterranean Part- nership that has lishing the conduct of bilateral relations between the EU and Syria. the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or the Barcelona Process .. in relation to the Syrian war form a new political landscape to which the EU.
Focus is on global institutions, policies and issues, global justice, EU policy-making and governance, and key Mediterranean issues. The Course enables students to undertake jobs involving abilities of analysis, organization and management in institutions operating at the European and international level, like the European Union, IGOs and NGOs, international firms, state and regional governments, private interest associations, international cooperation missions, consultancy, information and communication services.
Scientific rationale As we look at the impact of globalization on world and European politics, three areas of concern stand out. The first is the close interplay of politics, economy, and culture. The second is the increased importance of international regions to global and transnational affairs that fosters the engagement of state and non-state actors in policy-making processes at the world and region level.
Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship
The third is the role of international institutions in the governance of the contemporary world. These three domains, which are closely inter-linked, trigger off an increasing number of international public policies designed to solve the problems that globalization sets in the agenda like democracy building and consolidation, pollution, migration, human rights protection. In fact, the European Union is currently redefining its role in the world as well as its relations with the neighboring countries, especially the Mediterranean ones.
On this premise, the M. Degree in Global Politics and Euro-Mediterranean Relations offers an advanced training program to people eager to analyze how European and global institutions tackle the challenges set by the recent acceleration of the process of globalization, and the increased interdependence of societies, markets, and states. Such a context appears to be inimical to a renewal of Euro-Mediterranean policy that does not consist of adopting incremental measures based on the same approaches more commercial integration, more cooperation for a more limited number of Mediterranean countries.A look at the Russia/Syria relationship
The question is how to reverse the decline in the effectiveness of Euro-Mediterranean policies and what type of governance, instruments and narrative the EU should adopt with its neighbours to its immediate south. This analysis looks first at the change in the strategic Euro-Mediterranean context, subsequently contrasting it with the erosion of Euro-Mediterranean policies over the last decade.
Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship : Jorg Michael Dostal :
The following section sketches out some initial proposals for re-founding Euro-Mediterranean relations, taking the four aspects mentioned above into account. The final section concludes. At a global level, it appears that the international liberal order will have to be less ambitious than was expected just a few years ago. The importance assigned to security and the European neighbourhood and the reduced emphasis on promoting values mean that the objectives of EU foreign policy now seem to be more restrictive.
It has been argued that the Neighbourhood and Euro-Mediterranean policies were reasonably aligned with the European Security Strategy, a document in which the EU showed itself as a civil and normative power prepared to apply a widely-shared political agenda; by contrast, following the Arab uprisings and the European financial crisis there is an appreciable lack of EU strategic vision for the Mediterranean and less confidence in its capacity as a transformative power.
However, the tensions between principles and interests and the ambiguity inherent in the term erode its potential as a guide to European foreign policy. These tensions are less evident in the realm of climate-change resilience, the other major innovation of the EUGS, than in the political and social realm.
Specifically, the narrative of securitisation being used is equally problematic, with the focus on the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation on potential conflicts in the European neighbourhood, strengthened by an explicit comparison with the security sector.
Social resilience also has an economic dimension, but it is scarcely mentioned and nor is it stipulated to what extent the existing mechanisms for managing the economic interdependence with the neighbourhood are consistent with it.
What does seem clear is that achieving the security and resilience targets set by the EUGS, both social and environmental, requires the development of new common capabilities and a substantial reform of the institutional framework of neighbourhood and Euro-Mediterranean relations. A Euro-Mediterranean policy on the wane While the southern flank of the Mediterranean has risen in the European hierarchy of priorities and changed its strategic nature, the effectiveness of the regime complex that manages Euro-Mediterranean relations seems to be in retreat.
The Barcelona Process, set up by the conference held in that city inwhich created a comprehensive structure of association agreements with political, economic and social dimensions, went into decline for various reasons, both political and economic, analysis of which exceeds the scope of this section.
Ranging from the deterioration in the conflict between Israel and Palestine to the inability to include agriculture in the free trade agreements, including the failure to make headway in the political dimension, the Euro-Mediterranean Association seemed to reach its natural limits a decade after its creation.
As recently pointed out, however, the EU never committed itself to a full deployment of all the economic incentives at its disposal.
The European Neighbourhood Policy ENP was designed to complete the Euro-Mediterranean Association with a Europeanising normative focus befitting the vision that the EU had at that time of its own transformative effects. The offer of access to the single European market proved to be an excessively distant goal that could not be crystallised in short-term incentives. Countries such as Algeria even refused to draw up a Neighbourhood Action Plan, and the preferential arrangements, such as offers of advanced status, under this or other names, have proved to be ineffective in catalysing reforms to the extent that had been hoped.
The founding of the UfM elicited a curious retrospective nostalgia for the Barcelona process: It is true that the UfM was built on what it inherited from the Barcelona process and its framework of Association Agreements, including free trade areas between the Mediterranean partner countries and the EU.
Indeed, it may be asked what added value the UpM has provided: In reality, the UfM did not have to wait long to face the challenge to Euro-Mediterranean policy implicit in the Arab uprisings of It was a tough test, and the UfM soon exhibited its irrelevance, given that none of the proposed projects ranging from an abandoned Mediterranean Solar Plan to a scarcely necessary Euro-Mediterranean university addressed the causes underlying the uprisings, offering only responses that tinkered with the problem and technical projects far removed from the demands of southern societies for greater participation, redistribution and transparency.
Although built on the relationship between equals forged in Barcelona, the emphasis changed from a political discourse to one based on politically innocuous and, in some cases, economically unviable projects. While the UfM languished, the building blocks of the Barcelona process started to show signs of fatigue. Nowadays, in both Tunisia and Egypt, there is strong opposition to continuing deepening Euro-Mediterranean free trade, and it is openly debated whether it has had any positive impact on the population; worse still, access to the European markets and financing is perceived as a perk exclusively for the elites and a major source of inequality of opportunities.
Morocco has been dragging its feet for years on the new deep and comprehensive free-trade deal on the grounds that it is asymmetrical, and the recent decision by the EU Court of Justice to exclude the Western Sahara from the fisheries and agriculture free-trade agreement with the EU runs the risk of seriously undermining the ongoing negotiations.
It is true that by limiting the geographical area of cooperation this in initiative is assisted by a greater convergence of preferences and greater understanding of mutual interests. Something similar is happening with the projects managed by the UfM: A growing sense of Euro-Mediterranean fatigue has set in on both sides: The shrinking nature of the space for Euro-Mediterranean policies is evident in 1 the limitation of their expectations, 2 the ever-shrinking number of partners along the southern flank where such policies are perceived as relevant and 3 the growing competition with new regional and external actors.
European policies towards its neighbours, including to the south, already suffered from a crisis of expectations before the EUGS had a chance to undercut them.